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Regulation and Governance versus Criminology: disciplinary 
divides, intersections and opportunitiesi 
 
Paul Almond1 and Judith van Erp2 
 
Abstract  
This paper seeks to bridge the disciplinary gap between regulation and 
governance studies, and criminology. Based on a review of theoretical and 
empirical work on corporate crime, this paper argues that divergent 
approaches to questions of individual agency, localised variety, and political 
context, have drawn these two disciplines in different directions. Regulatory 
governance scholarship has thrived as a discipline, but also narrowed its 
focus around these issues. Corporate criminology offers a means of 
broadening this focus by drawing attention to the normative theorizing behind 
the regulatory project. At the same time, however, insights drawn from 
regulatory governance scholarship can prompt corporate criminology to 
innovate by broadening the scope of its engagement beyond the sphere of 
traditional criminal justice. The paper argues for the development of a 
research agenda to sit at their intersection, and which engages with the 
challenges that exist at the interface between criminal and regulatory law. 
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Introduction 
Although it is now well-established as a discrete ‘institutional field’ (Lodge 2016; 
Levi-Faur 2011), ‘regulation and governance studies’ has been subject to 
reassessment, challenge, and calls for reflection in recent years. Some of this has 
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come from commentators who wish to assess its development and scope (Koop and 
Lodge 2017; Lodge 2016; Picciotto 2017), to appraise its strengths and weaknesses 
(Almond & Gray 2017; Black 2002), and to critique the assumptions upon which it is 
based (Tombs 2015). Many of these criticisms have been prompted by perceived 
crises of regulation, such as the global financial crisis of 2007-8, with its evidence of 
recurrent failures of oversight and risk-management at all levels. Ongoing social 
challenges, including the implications of Brexit for EU and UK regulatory systems, a 
US Presidency that challenges regulatory assumptions of rationality and legitimacy, 
and the threat of global climate change, also provoke an ongoing need for reflection. 
Our contribution to this process is to examine the relationship between regulation 
and governance studies and another discipline with an interest in similar questions of 
ordering within the organisational sphere, namely, the criminology of corporate 
crime. Despite sharing a great deal in terms of their origins and substantive focus 
(Braithwaite 2000), these two disciplines have increasingly diverged in recent years. 
While regulation and governance studies has experienced an upsurge in its 
influence, coming to occupy a position of relative prestige (Lodge 2016), corporate 
criminology has largely disappeared from the regulation and governance field. This 
paper identifies the reasons for this, and argues that the opportunities for mutual 
disciplinary enrichment mean that the criminology-regulation link should be renewed 
for the future. 
Most accounts of regulation and governance studies pinpoint its emergence as a 
sub-field in the 1980s, in response to the growth of a ‘new regulatory state’, the 
proliferation of new control mechanisms ‘beyond the state’, and the challenges that 
this posed (Baldwin et al. 1998; Braithwaite 2000; Braithwaite et al. 2007: 2-3; Levi-
Faur 2012; 2013; Picciotto 2017). Regulation has been defined as the ‘intentional 
intervention in the activities of a target population, where the intervention is typically 
direct – involving binding standard-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning – and 
exercised by public-sector actors on the economic activities of private-sector actors’ 
(Koop & Lodge 2017: 105, building on Selznick 1985: 363; Black 2002: 26). It is 
generally understood to constitute a narrower undertaking than ‘governance’, the 
process of ‘providing, distributing, and regulating’, of which regulation constitutes one 
‘large subset’ (Braithwaite et al. 2007: 3; also Black 2002: 6). Such scholarship is 





Braithwaite 2000: 225), and an emphasis on ‘governance’ as a process of change 
(Levi-Faur 2012: 7-9), but remains ‘ecumenical on definitional questions, on what 
matters substantively, on disciplines and interdisciplinarity, and on epistemology’ 
(Braithwaite et al. 2007: 5). From the outset, criminologists were a central 
component of this interdisciplinary project; as issues of crime, harm, and social 
conflict were drawn within the scope of the regulatory state (Braithwaite et al. 2007).  
Criminology, ‘the body of knowledge regarding crime as a social phenomenon 
[including]…processes of making laws, of breaking laws, and of reacting towards the 
breaking of laws’ (Sutherland & Cressey 1960: 3), includes corporate criminology, 
the study of the ‘conduct of a corporation, or of employees acting on behalf of a 
corporation, which is proscribed and punishable by law’ (Braithwaite 1984: 6), as 
established via the work of Clinard and Yeager (1980), among others. This is in 
contrast to the study of white-collar crime, which is individually-oriented and typically, 
but not exclusively, committed by privileged individuals (Shover & Cullen 2008; Van 
Erp & Huisman 2017). Criminology’s influence on early regulation and governance 
scholarship was significant. A subject-oriented approach to understanding 
motivations for offending and non-offending was imported into early regulatory 
compliance studies by scholars who came to that new discipline from a 
criminological background, and was particularly visible in their study of the role of 
subjective factors such as ‘principled disagreements’ and ‘incompetence’ within firms 
(Kagan & Scholz 1984), the influence of industry norms and group dynamics 
(Braithwaite 1984), and the blocking of opportunities to conform to professional 
values (Braithwaite & Makkai 1991; Makkai & Braithwaite 1991). These early 
criminology-influenced regulatory scholars also positioned the study of enforcement 
practices as a central concern of regulatory studies by examining how complex 
interactions between enforcers and regulated, such as negotiation and ‘bargain and 
bluff’, build trust and virtue, and construct and maintain compliance (Grabosky & 
Braithwaite 1986; Haines 1997; Hawkins 1983; Shapiro 1984). Finally, they 
embedded a strong empirical tradition of studying processes of regulatory 
policymaking in their social and political contexts (Calavita & Pontell 1990; Carson 
1982). In doing so, this nascent regulation and governance literature drew widely 
upon ‘classic’ criminology, including the ideas of Sutherland, Matza, Hirschi, Cloward 





Although some scholars continue to work at the intersection of regulatory 
governance and criminology, over time, the visibility of criminology within regulation 
and governance studies has declined sharply. By way of an example, the 
criminological sources cited above have virtually disappeared from the regulatory 
literature; only four of the more than 300 articles published in Regulation & 
Governance since its inception have cited the work of Edwin Sutherland, the 
‘founding father’ (Friedrichs 2015: 549) of corporate crime scholarship. This may be 
attributed to the increasing prevalence of political science and public law 
methodologies, and the development of a pragmatic approach to the study of social 
ordering problems, within regulation and governance studies (Lacey 2004; 
Braithwaite et al. 2007; Parker 2008: 355). At the same time, corporate criminology 
has contributed to this process by diversifying (like political science: Almond 1988) 
into multiple schools of thought along ideological and methodological axes. Similar to 
distinctions between ‘critical’ versus ‘professional’ or ‘policy’ sociology (Burawoy 
2005) and political science (Flinders 2013), or ‘hard left’ and ‘hard right’, in Almond’s 
terms (1988: 832-5), critical and interpretive (‘populist’, Shover & Cullen 2008) 
corporate criminology can be differentiated from a more empirical and positivist 
(‘mainstream’: Friedrichs 2015: 552 or ‘administrative’ (Matthews 2017) or  ‘patrician’ 
(Shover and Cullen 2008) tradition. While the former aims to expose and critique the 
power relations and hidden assumptions that shape criminal justice, the latter seeks 
to generate insights grounded in observed practice, rather than critiquing the values 
underlying that practice. This also maps onto a less uniform distinction between 
Anglo-American and European corporate criminology traditions (Croall 2015), with 
the former perhaps more characterised by the polarisation discussed above, and the 
latter characterised by work which sits in ‘softer’, more contextually-responsive 
categories falling between these poles. 
These differences of ideological (between ‘critical’ and ‘objectivist’) and 
methodological (between ‘theoretical-interpretive’ and ‘scientific-positivist’) approach 
have left these different traditions occupying ‘separate tables’, working in parallel but 
in isolation from each other (Almond 1988). Regulation and governance studies 
seem to conform more closely to the objectivist and scientific-positivist tradition than 
criminology and, indeed, sits at an objectivist and interpretivist ‘table’ of its own 





Differences of approach to issues of individual agency, power and politics, and the 
public/private divide, which this paper will outline, lend support to such a conclusion. 
Such differences also help explain why regulation and governance studies’ 
consciousness of, and engagement with, corporate criminology has been limited to 
the critical and interpretivist tradition. It is this strand which has most consciously 
positioned itself, and been positioned in turn, in opposition to regulation and 
governance studies, an opposition which has, at times, been highly confrontational 
(for example, Hawkins 1990 and Pearce & Tombs 1990; and Tombs 2015 and 
Lodge 2016). For each side, it has perhaps been useful to define the kind of 
academic and intellectual endeavour one is not engaged in, by reference to the 
perceived limitations of an opponent.  
These differences have also been reinforced by the need to frame arguments to ‘fit’ 
with theoretical traditions and publishing conventions in each discipline. Scholars 
working at the intersection of regulatory studies and criminology often have to 
choose between the language of ‘crime’ and the language of ‘risk’, or between a 
focus on analytical precision or political dynamics, depending on the disciplinary 
alignment of their intended publication outlet. These strategies have perhaps created 
their own, self-reinforcing, institutional realities, as well as the risk of caricatured, 
limited perceptions of the value of other disciplines. The ‘corporate criminology’ that 
is most familiar to scholars working within regulation and governance studies is thus 
unrepresentative of the variety of work done on issues of corporate ordering, and is 
also, by virtue of its oppositionality, necessarily less useful to their work, tending to 
reject, rather than complement, their approach. Our view, which we substantiate in 
this paper, is that regulation and governance studies has overlooked a diverse and 
valuable literature as a result of this narrow engagement. As a result, it has failed to 
benefit from the insights that this literature provides into corporate crimes as a 
product of individual and organizational motivations, justifications, and conditions. 
This paper identifies three core tendencies within regulation and governance 
scholarship that position it in contrast to much of the corporate criminology literature. 
First, much regulatory governance scholarship takes a more institutionalist view of 
the regulatory process than criminology, which places a greater emphasis on 
questions of individual agency and localised variety. Second, it often engages in a 





assessing the effectiveness of regulatory regimes rather than grounding the choice 
of these regulatory arrangements in questions of power and ambiguity. And third, 
regulatory governance scholarship takes a relatively benign view of the phenomena 
it engages with, seeing (unlike criminology) ‘governance’ beyond the state as an 
unproblematic means of extending society’s capacity to regulate risk. Via a review of 
both seminal theoretical and recent empirical work on corporate crime, this paper 
contributes to bringing these two disciplines together, demonstrating the ways in 
which a criminological approach can broaden the scope of regulation and 
governance studies, and draw attention to the normative theorizing behind the 
regulatory project. Criminology, for its part, has tended to overlook the potential of 
private controls which emerge from civil society, and regulatory insights offer a 
means of broadening the criminological imagination about societal responses to 
crimes and deviancy in turn. A research agenda positioned at the intersection of 
criminological and regulatory governance scholarship, which sought to combine the 
‘ways of seeing’ inherent to each discipline, would be able to more comprehensively 
account for the realities of corporate noncompliance. It would also better account for 
the punitive and regulatory capacity of criminal sanctions, of prosecutorial 
agreements and administrative sanctions, and of compliance programmes.  
Issues of Agency and Motivation 
Since its formation as a disciplinary area, regulation and governance studies has 
addressed the overarching question of how regulators can best exert influence over 
the actions of the regulated population, so as to produce desirable outcomes. Much 
of the regulatory literature is focused primarily on the interactions that occur between 
‘regulated firms’ and the multitude of external agencies, organisations, and actors 
that seek to influence their behaviour. While there is great variety in the way that 
‘regulators’ are conceived of in this literature (public, private, voluntary, market-
based, networked, and so on), this top-down view tends to view the organisational 
entities that engage with it as uniform actors with easily-identifiable motives and 
interests (Gray & Silbey 2014). Regulation is often presented as a strategic, 
instrumental, and focused, rather than organic, messy, or contingent (Almond & Gray 
2017: 7; though see Overdevest & Zeitlin’s regulatory ‘experimentalism’: 2014). 
Following a general tendency within the regulatory state to prefer formal regulation 





are also downplayed in regulatory studies. The regulated populations studied tend to 
be narrowly-defined and so the pluralism (Parker 2008) identified in regulation and 
governance studies generally falls on the ‘regulator’ side of the regulator-regulatee 
dyad. As one example of this, the majority of empirical and practice-based case-
studies published in Regulation & Governance between 2015-2017 focused on the 
relationship between the ‘regulatory state’, in one form or another, and regulated 
organizations. They emphasised functional, firm-level explanatory factors (size, type, 
similarity, ownership status, and geographical distribution: for example Fransen & 
Conzelmann 2015; Shi & van Rooij 2016), thereby grounding their analysis at the 
level of the regulated firm as a whole. Very few studies (nine of 46 published 
empirical or case studies) engaged explicitly with a broader range of regulatory 
subjects or micro-level motivations and dynamics (for instance, Etienne 2015; Mills & 
Koliba 2015).  
There are a number of explanations for this institutional focus. First, regulatory 
governance primarily conceives of legitimacy as a procedural, rather than a 
normative, matter (Baldwin 1995; Black 2008), and procedural legitimacy is sought 
through institutions that structure legality, accountability and due process (Tyler 
2011). Second, regulatory systems are typically concerned with delivering continuity, 
so regulatory scholars commonly focus on questions of institutional architecture, 
such as ‘how does the regulatory system work?’ and ‘how can it be made to work 
better?’ Corporate criminology, by contrast, is centrally focused on the breakdown of 
systems of behaviour-regulation, as expressed via the causes, occurrence, and 
consequences of corporate crimes. This lens diverts attention more typically to a 
focus on disruptions such as disasters and failures, and to questions such as ‘what 
went wrong?’ and ‘why did this happen?’. While regulatory scholars do focus on 
discontinuities, they tend to view such exceptional events as highlighting the 
tensions within, and limitations of, stable regulatory systems (Casey and Lawless 
2011; Haines 1999; Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock 2017; Mills & Koliba 2015), rather than 
treating them, as criminology often does, as fundamental political challenges to 
those systems (Bradshaw 2015; Calavita & Pontell 1990; Tombs 2015). Some 
scholars, who straddle these disciplinary boundaries, have contributed work that 
combines both a grasp of institutional process and influence, and a broader sense of 





A third feature of regulation and governance studies that accounts for this 
institutional focus is its historical links to economic approaches to social policy, 
viewing regulation as a means of correcting market failures and inefficiencies (Breyer 
1982; Veljanovski 2010). Such a focus necessitates a macro-level approach to 
intervention, as this is where the strategic realignment of incentives can best be 
performed, but this narrows the focus in terms of the pressures associated with 
regulated populations. By contrast, Mills and Koliba’s (2015) study of the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster argues that a reliance upon marketised accountability systems, to 
the exclusion of other decision-making frames, created significant gaps within the 
regulatory framework for offshore safety. Similarly, many criminological studies of 
organisational compliance demonstrate that variants of economic motivation 
predominate at the firm level, where issues of material benefit and economic 
squeeze dictate the likelihood of compliance with the law, in accordance with 
conceptions of rationalised organisational choice (Simpson & Rorie 2011; also 
Paternoster & Simpson 1993; Rorie 2015; Thornton et al. 2005; 2009). A 
criminological perspective also introduces a range of motivational factors beyond 
economic rationality, that shape offending behaviour and the dynamics of control, 
and which expand on the notion of a normative ‘duty to comply’ found within the 
regulatory compliance literature (Gunningham et al. 2005; Kagan et al. 2011; Nielsen 
& Parker 2012). At the level of firms themselves, these explanations have included 
the existence of anomic discrepancies between cultural social goals and the 
institutional means of firms (Passas 1990; Young 2012; van de Bunt & van Wingerde 
2015), the criminogenic structural necessities of the contemporary capitalist system 
(Punch 2000; Tombs & Whyte 2007), and the creation of industry-wide cultures of 
motivation, opportunity, and control (Bradshaw 2015; Fligstein & Roehrkasse 2016; 
Williams 2008).  
A final reason for this focus on institutional agency is that regulation and governance 
studies emphasises the role of pluralised networks and ‘horizontal relationships’ 
between institutions as the driver of compliance (Black 2008; Braithwaite & Drahos 
2000; Cashore et al. 2011; Levi-Faur 2012). The central dynamic of regulation is 
often viewed as a dyad one between large-scale, monolithic (public) regulators and 
(private) regulatees (Ford 2013; Koop & Lodge 2017), overlooking other actors (such 





rights (Almond & Gray 2017: 13-15). This is despite the efforts of seminal regulatory 
theorists to acknowledge and identify the ‘many players’ and ‘many selves’ that 
coexist within regulatory settings, and to advocate differential forms of regulatory 
engagement across these constituencies (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992: 33). This has 
been a less well-explored component of the ‘responsive regulation’ agenda, as the 
scale of this concept has been generally limited to mid-range, organisational 
interactions, and not generally scaled either upwards or downwards (Ford 2013). 
The corporate crime literature contributes to our understandings of individual motives 
for organisational behaviours, particularly within ‘vertical relationships’ between 
organisations and their individual members – the influence of organizational goals, 
culture, and hierarchy on behaviour of various actors within organizations (as 
opposed to the ‘horizontal relationships’ between regulated entities). Why do people 
commit unlawful activities for the benefit of the collective entities to which they 
belong? There has been considerable study of the role of individual self-control in 
causing impulsive, risk-taking behaviour on the part of corporate decision-makers 
(Piquero & Moffitt 2014; Reed & Yeager 1996; Schoepfer et al. 2014; Simpson & 
Piquero 2002). Others have pointed to socio-cultural factors such as gender 
(Steffensmeier et al. 2013), organizational identity (Klinkhammer 2015), social 
networks (Bichler et al. 2015), as well as organizational culture (Simpson & Piquero 
2002). In doing so, these explanations link to Sutherland’s explanation of individual 
acts of white-collar criminality (1949: ch.15) as an outcome of ‘differential 
associations’, or the social learning of definitions of offending as desirable and 
positive, and of compliance as avoidable and negative. For Sutherland, it is initiation 
into the corporate setting which exposes individuals to attitudes that legitimate 
noncompliance; for others, this is more a case of learning ‘techniques of 
neutralization’, methods of reconciling one’s own beliefs to the contextual norms of 
organisational offending by downplaying the wrongdoing committed (Stadler & 
Benson 2012). In response, enforcement systems must provide external definitions 
that challenge these learned tendencies, bringing us back to the issue of legitimacy 
and acceptance of the law. Criminological studies have illustrated the importance of 
moral education in shaping law-conforming behaviour (Jackson et al. 2012), and 
have asserted the value of communicative legal forms (including the use of criminal 





Micro-level regulatory interactions have also been explored in more recent studies 
that straddle the regulation-criminology divide, and which engage with the attitudinal 
components of regulatory interaction as a driver of offending behaviour (Rorie 2015; 
van Wingerde 2016; Pautz et al. 2017). This suggests that there is no ‘blindness’ to 
agency within regulation and governance scholarship, rather, that attention has 
tended to focus on the architecture and arrangement of regulatory systems rather 
than the subjective experiences and social interactions that motivate compliance and 
non-compliance. Regulatory scholarship has begun to explore the agency of a 
greater range of actors within the regulatory sphere, including ‘sociological citizens’ 
who mediate and implement regulation (Haines 2011a; Silbey 2011), workers and 
middle-managers who bear individual responsibilities (Gray 2006), and empowered 
individuals who share in endogenous legal relationships (Edelman et al.1999). In 
doing so, it has been influenced by criminological insights, but has arguably tended 
to focus on strategic interpersonal interactions, rather than the dynamics of 
hierarchy, power, and authority within regulated firms, which remains a ‘lost 
component’ within such studies (Gray & Silbey 2014). Some important literature has 
worked towards an integration of individual and organizational drivers of compliance 
(Rorie 2015; Simpson et al. 1998), illustrating the complexity of these micro-macro 
connections. Much of the recent empirical research that has engaged with the long-
term formation of business cultures that facilitate law-breaking has been published in 
criminological or socio-legal outlets (Bradshaw 2015; Klinkhammer 2015; Rorie et al. 
2015; van Wingerde 2016), and offers an underexplored source of insight into the 
contextual underpinnings of the regulatory sphere. 
At the same time, there are insights into organisational offending that corporate 
criminology can draw from regulation and governance studies. The first is to grasp a 
clearer understanding of the dynamics and risks associated with the adoption of 
governance-based strategies within criminal settings. Regulation and governance 
studies have devoted a great deal of attention to the limits and trade-offs that such 
processes involve when left to operate unchecked, not least in the creation (and 
offsetting) of counterproductive dynamics of diffusion, capture, and bounded 
rationality (Ford 2010; Mills & Koliba 2015). As criminal justice systems embrace 
modes of risk governance (Braithwaite 2000; Garland 1997), there is a need for a 





(Haines 2011b). The second point relates to the value of specificity, particularity, and 
context in seeking to explain corporate offending. Regulation and governance 
studies have provided many nuanced, detailed, and context-specific accounts of 
corporate rule-breaking. Corporate criminology, however, has increasingly adopted 
the disciplinary tendency to universalise individualistic and rationalistic explanatory 
factors across context-sensitive areas of offending (from drug-related, juvenile-, and 
street-crime, to corporate and white-collar crime) in pursuit of a scientific ‘truth’ about 
human behaviour. This leads to an emphasis upon individual risk factors, life-course 
trajectories, and the internal capacities of those within organisations (Piquero & 
Moffitt 2014; Schoepfer et al. 2014; Simpson & Piquero 2002). This also reflects the 
growing divide between positivist and critical corporate criminologists, and may 
indicate some desperation on the part of the former to ‘fit in’ to the disciplinary 
mainstream and signal the maturation of their field and methods. Further, a risk of 
individualistic accounts is that the unique opportunities for generating, hiding and 
spending illegal profit provided by the corporate setting are downplayed.  
The third learning point for criminology is in developing a more nuanced 
understanding of the relationship between the causes of, and possible responses to, 
corporate wrongdoing. As a discipline, criminology offers an insight into a range of 
motivations beyond those associated with economic rationality, and has begun to 
make a more sophisticated contribution to debates around corporate deterrence, 
stressing the relative merits of prevention and cooperative education, the need for 
consistent engagement, and the upsides of administrative sanctioning (for example, 
Simpson et al. 2014). Critical corporate criminology, on the other hand, remains 
centrally focused on a model of response that is grounded in the deterrence of 
calculated, rational offending (Tombs & Whyte 2007; 2015). This school of corporate 
criminology is arguably the only branch of criminology to argue that a punitive 
strategy of criminalization and deterrence-based sanctioning is a good thing (Haines 
& Hall 2004: 269-70). It does not share the more optimistic view of administrative 
sanctions and alternatives to prosecution held within regulation and governance 
studies, and within other branches of criminology, including more positivist strands of 
corporate criminology. Indeed, ironically, it also tends to be sceptical about the value 
of state-imposed punishment as a means of crime control in general. As will be 





responsive to, the broader understanding of motives and agency that corporate 
criminology, broadly defined, is interested in understanding. 
The Role of Power and Politics 
Just as there is a divergence between the approaches taken by corporate 
criminology and regulation and governance studies to issues of agency, so there is a 
divergence in how they treat issues of power, definition, and politics. In large part, 
this latter divergence is a product of the same epistemological and methodological 
differences that account for the former. Corporate criminology is the study of the role 
of elite actors in wrongdoing, meaning that a special interest is taken in harms 
emerging from the intersection of economic and political power. While regulatory 
governance scholars explain how regulatory arrangements function in their political, 
institutional, economic, and social contexts, critical corporate criminology in particular 
has been distinguished by its aims to make the ‘crimes of the powerful’ visible 
(Pearce, 1976; Barak 2015). It does this by categorising them as crimes, drawing 
attention to their otherwise-invisible victims and harmful consequences, explaining 
the differences between corporate crime and ‘street crime’ (in terms of public 
condemnation and enforcement), and showing how corporations avoid 
criminalization and define the law so as to permit profit maximization. These social 
and legal reactions are constructed via the social and economic power of networks 
of business leaders, corporations, political elites, regulators, and financial and private 
regulatory actors (such as auditing and accounting firms; Haines 2014). These 
power relations are sometimes structurally embedded within the political economy 
and sometimes situational and circumstantial in nature. As such, corporate crime can 
be a product of either overt and systemic corruption (Friedrichs 2015), or indirect 
collusion and influence within corporate-political relations (Haines 2014), as in the 
case of campaign financing and ‘revolving door’ relationships leading to lenient 
enforcement (Ramirez 2016).  
1. Ambiguities of scope and definition 
A pioneering contributor to the study of corporate and white-collar crime (and one 
often overlooked in favour of Edwin Sutherland) was the Dutch criminologist and 
sociologist Willem Bonger (Hebberecht 2015; Braithwaite 1984). Bonger (1916) 





frauds, thus underpinning Edwin Sutherland’s later work. The capacity to avoid 
detection means that corporate and white-collar crimes remain more socially 
ambiguous than most other offences, particularly in terms of whether they are 
labelled as ‘crimes’. Measuring the extent of corporate and white-collar crime 
according to legal definitions and official sources (conviction rates) achieves greater 
precision and objectivity, but in doing so, trades off validity for reliability, by focusing 
attention onto prevalent but trivial offending rather than the serious harms inflicted by 
elites (Pontell 2016, Benson et al. 2016, Shapiro 1984). Many corporate harms are 
not formally criminalized, and are instead defined as liability conflicts, tortious 
wrongs, or simply as ‘undesirable’. Sutherland’s definition (1949) included offences 
that were not legally criminalized, and so provided a more valid reflection of these 
social harms and the power dimensions underlying criminalization (Geis 2016), but 
at the expense of some ambiguity (Tappan 1947).  
These definitional ambiguities have severe methodological consequences. First, 
positivist criminological studies relying on official data sets may grossly 
underestimate the amount of corporate crime, as most remain undetected or 
unprosecuted. This can mean that explanations of the individual characteristics of 
offenders may focus onto particular populations (such as the middle-class: Weisburd 
et al. 1991; Shapiro 1984) and invalidly overlook other groups and issues. Problems 
also exist for empirical criminological scholars in gaining access to data, particularly 
within corporations (a ‘criminology’ affiliation can deter data sources), and 
researchers may run the risk of liability claims. This was the reason why the first 
edition of Sutherland’s (1949) inventory of the crimes of major American corporations 
was anonymized, and why certain academic publishers remain unwilling to publish 
research findings where corporate offenders can be identified. Third, definitional 
ambiguity may translate into ambiguity of findings and limit the ability to draw 
unqualified conclusions. In particular, Rorie et al. (2017) argue that meta-analysis 
may be unsuited to corporate crime research, as differences in conceptualizing the 
dependent variable prevent systematic aggregation of findings. This not only 
disadvantages corporate crime scholarship in the establishment and testing of theory 
(in comparison to less ambiguous areas of social life), but also hinders the 
development of criminal policy, as this increasingly seeks to be informed by 





While it is clear that behavior that is ‘lawful but awful’ should be part of a criminology 
that deals with social harms inflicted by the powerful, this leaves corporate and 
white-collar crime scholarship vulnerable to criticism that it is unable to reach 
agreement on its empirical domain with any clarity (Friedrichs 2015). Regulatory 
governance scholarship, by contrast, has avoided controversy about its scope as ‘it 
is not preoccupied with what counts as ‘law’, but has got on with…empirically 
understanding that interaction…unconstrained in scope and approach by…traditional 
state-centered conceptions of law’ (Parker 2008: 355). Although definitional 
controversies sometimes distract from the content of argument, they also go to the 
heart of criminology as a discipline. In our view, criminology is not just a substantive 
subject area (studying ‘crime’ as ‘education’ is studied within education studies), but 
an undertaking committed to shedding light on processes of criminalization, the role 
of powerful actors and victims in these processes, the gap between legal and 
societal definitions of ‘crime’, and the effectiveness of criminalization in expressing 
normative disapproval of behavior. Definitional ambiguities act as indices of social 
change, reflecting processes of transition as particular harms start to be recognized, 
along with power imbalances that provide opportunities for (global) entrepreneurship 
while leaving associated social costs unaddressed (Nelken 2012). ‘Corporate crimes’ 
thus reflect ongoing processes of competition between values of shareholder reward 
and consumption on the one hand, and consumer protection; human rights, and 
ecology on the other hand. Examples of this include the criminalization of ‘big 
tobacco’ (McCann et al. 2013) and of cartels (Haines & Beaton-Wells 2012; Parker 
2012); or the development of ‘green criminology’ to address harms to ecosystems 
and animals and their resulting injustices (White 2011).  
2. Ambiguities of application and enforcement 
The ambiguities outlined above extend into the practical sphere of enforcement, 
which is disproportionately directed at smaller, less professional firms (Shapiro 1984; 
van Erp 2011; Parker 2012), leaving large and powerful firms untouched, as they are 
better at ‘isolating themselves from the possibility the law would apply its full force to 
them personally’ (Parker 2012: 16). Enforcement thus becomes a tool for the 
entrenchment of structural differences between privileged and less-privileged 
economic actors. Regulatory responses to corporate crime, with their reliance on 





and third-party auditing, have been accused of contributing to the moral ambiguity of 
corporate crime by tolerating or implicitly authorizing social harms (Nelken 2012). On 
this view, those regulatory measures can also translate into ambivalent forms of 
oversight, and a permissive business regulatory culture which, if not causing 
offending, play an important explanatory role as ‘contributing precedents’ to it 
(Michalowski & Kramer 2007). Many explanations of corporate and white-collar crime 
which focus on systemic causes and macro-meso-micro connections, emphasise the 
role that ambiguities in the regulatory context play in shaping individual behavior 
(Nelken 2012), as in the Madoff frauds (Young 2012), the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
(Bradshaw 2015); and in real estate frauds (van de Bunt & van Wingerde 2015). 
These factors are also relevant in the explanation of failures of transnational 
regulation and governance.  
Debates about criminalization highlight an additional source of the ambiguity of 
corporate and white-collar crime. The ‘pacifying’ role of criminalization as a means 
for symbolically solving social conflict was identified by the Norwegian sociologist 
Vilhelm Aubert (1952). It remains relevant to understanding how the legal 
criminalization of corporate conduct serves to symbolically satisfy public demands for 
‘justice’, but in forms that are not stringently enforced, so that the economic interests 
of elites are not damaged. An important finding from early ‘criminological’ regulatory 
scholarship was that ambiguities are not just the cause of differential criminalization 
practices, but also their effect; that is, they are produced in response to the interests 
of prevailing economic, social, and political formations (Carson 1982). ‘Special’ 
regulatory frameworks, which view regulations are quasi-legal and as existing to 
facilitate, rather than restrain, the operation of firms, may be instituted to 
‘exceptionalize’ key industries (1982: ch.5). Contemporary examples are provided 
via the use of ‘deferred prosecution agreements’ or arbitrage in financial regulation, 
which, from a regulatory perspective, are evaluated on their effectiveness as 
governance arrangement for corporate behavior (Barkow & Barkow 2011). Such 
instrumental uses of the criminal law may, however, undermine rather than support 
the public legitimation of criminalization processes (Lacey 2004). For criminologists, 
they may be read as expressions of corporate exceptionalism and social injustice, 
and evaluated according to their normative and deterrent effects. Critical 





why there is no moral indignation over corporate crime (Laufer 2014), why 
prosecutors compromise with corporations that are ‘too big to jail’ (Garrett 2014), 
what can be done when wrongdoers are ‘too big to fail [but] too powerful in jail’ 
(Pontell et al. 2014), ‘why not jail’ the powerful (Steinzor 2014), and how to respond 
to the ‘theft of a nation’ (Barak 2012)? Empirically, this is not clear-cut; the lengthy 
sentences applied in dramatic U.S. corporate fraud cases far exceed those that 
might occur in Europe, for example (Levi 2016), and public perceptions of the need 
to punish harm-causing companies seem to strengthen in times of austerity (Shelley 
& Hogan 2013).  
The ideological character of this critical corporate crime scholarship contrasts with 
the tenor of regulatory governance scholarship, which has itself been critiqued for 
tending to translate political issues into instrumental problems (Mascini 2013). 
Similar to critiques addressed to political science (Flinders 2013; Mead 2010) and 
‘administrative’ criminology (Matthews 2017), regulatory governance risks becoming 
overly policy-oriented or even scholastic, rather than addressing deep structural 
causes. John Braithwaite, a social advocate and outstanding academic, has argued 
for the combination of this commitment to social movements with a commitment to 
good science via research which integrates explanatory and normative theory 
(Braithwaite, 2002: x). Similarly, the systematic, objective account of deterrence-
based approaches to corporate crime undertaken by Simpson et al. (2014) highlights 
the role that evidence of this sort plays in underpinning normative theory. The 
marrying of these interpretative tendencies with evidence-based objectivity of this 
sort allows criminological scholarship to assist regulatory governance scholars in 
engaging in a more politicised analysis of the empirical relation between states and 
markets (Mascini 2013) and of the consequences of regulatory governance 
arrangements for both the elites and the ‘powerless’. The difficulty of doing so 
perhaps accounts for the relative decline in the visibility and influence of corporate 
crime scholarship.  
3. Ambiguities of social context and reaction 
This ambiguity is not limited to formal social controls. A particular contribution of 
criminological scholarship has been the study of ambiguity in media representations 
of corporate and white-collar crime. Criminological scholarship has found that typical 





condemn it, portraying the glamorous lifestyles of white-collar criminals (Levi 2006) 
rather than analysing the underlying structural causes of corporate crimes, and 
framing corporate crimes as accidents rather than purposive actions (Machin & Mayr 
2013; Buist & Leighton 2015; Wright et al. 1995). The regulatory impacts of publicity 
sanctions and ‘naming-and-shaming’ processes are also undermined by the capacity 
of larger offenders to utilise their resources to counter negative publicity via portrayal 
as legitimate equal parties in pro-business national media. At the same time, smaller 
businesses continue to be portrayed as ‘rogue traders’ in consumer-oriented local 
media (van Erp 2013), and regulators are portrayed as overzealous in general 
(Almond 2009). By discursively constructing corporate crimes as ambiguous, news 
media contribute to a societal climate in which corporate crime is accepted as a fact 
of life (Rosoff 2007; Williams 2008; Wright et al. 1995), while similar acts of 
wrongdoing by public institutions are censured much more heavily (Greer & 
McLaughlin 2017). These representations influence the depth of public knowledge 
about elite deviance and diminish perceptions of seriousness and punitiveness. 
Recent research finds similar perceptions with internet news consumers (Michel et 
al. 2016), but also suggests that news consumers with existing (pro-capitalism) 
worldviews tend to reject information about crimes of the powerful (Michel 2018). 
Taken together, this demonstrates that the media (including social media) should be 
considered as significant governance actors (for better or worse), but remain largely 
overlooked within regulatory governance studies. 
The scholarship on state-corporate crime is perhaps the most prominent strand of 
scholarship addressing the political and power aspects of corporate crime. State-
corporate crime was introduced as a sensitizing concept to better understand how 
illegal or socially injurious actions result from symbiotic state-corporate relations that 
create ‘a political culture and organizational frameworks that ultimately led to heinous 
acts that would not have occurred without that culture and those frameworks’ 
(Michalowski & Kramer 2007: 206). The study of state-corporate crime tends to focus 
on the social conditions of unequal power that produce crime, and political-economic 
structures that shapes relations between states and corporations (Bernat & Whyte 
2016). This can take several forms: in ‘state-initiated’ corporate crimes, political 
actors commission crimes and corporate actors operate at their direction or with their 





facilitated’ corporate crime. A third category is ‘corporate-facilitated state crime’, in 
which corporations provide assistance in the commission of state crimes, a concept 
applied to understand, for example, how German corporations assisted in the 
Holocaust via the production of Zyklon B gas by IG Farben, and the construction of 
concentration camp ovens by Topf & Sohne (van Baar & Huisman 2012). Both the 
first and third of these categories are closely related to issues of state crime, of 
political crime, of military- and war-crimes (so-called ‘gold-collar crime’: Brants 2007), 
and crimes of globalisation, all areas of study that are relevant to regulatory 
governance scholars.  
Perhaps most relevant to issues of regulation and governance, however, is the 
second category of ‘state-facilitated’ corporate crime. This can occur when, rather 
than committing corporate crimes themselves, states share common goals with 
offending corporations, which would be hampered by aggressive regulation, and so 
they facilitate it via regulatory institutions which fail to restrain deviant business 
activities. Thus, governments provide the enabling institutional context for harmful 
corporate behavior in ‘regimes of permission’ that create structures of corporate 
impunity (Whyte 2014). Perhaps the classic account of such a regime is provided by 
Carson’s study (1982) of the offshore North Sea oil sector, where the shared 
interests of the UK government and the oil industry in extraction and revenue-raising 
led to weak regulatory oversight, a culture of risk-taking, and an acceptance of 
widespread harm as an acceptable cost of pursuing the national interest. Another 
example of state-facilitated corporate crime is provided by the ‘benign neglect’ of 
fraud by the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) in the US commercial 
banking industry, contributing to the banking crisis of 2008 (Tillman 2015) and the 
more in general anomic regulatory culture preceding it (Young 2012). Within the 
extractive industry, state-corporate crime is apparent in the reliance of transnational 
corporations on repressive state apparatuses to impose their corporate will on local 
populations in the Niger Delta oilfields (Ezeonu 2015: 100) and the Colombian gold 
mining industry (Zaitch & Gutierrez Gomez 2015). Global warming is also viewed as 
a matter of state-corporate crime, with climate-change denial exposed as a 
concerted action of multinational corporate and state actors to collectively block 
efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and exclude the issue of climate 





environment, corporate interests have directly influenced political decision-making, 
creating regulatory regimes that suppress progressive change (Kramer & 
Michalowski 2012).  
The interactionist framing of state-corporate crime scholarship provides a direct 
parallel to the institutional structures found within governance studies. 21st century 
processes of globalisation and digitalisation have created ‘counter-hegemonic 
transnational networks’ (Ward & Green 2016: 229) through which victims of state 
crime can secure justice; transnational legal pluralism has thus created more diverse 
opportunities for ‘criminalization’, broadly understood, than traditional concepts of 
state and state-corporate crime acknowledged (Ward & Green 2016). However, the 
market-government-civil society ‘governance triangle’ that underpins regulatory 
scholarship is cast in a more problematic light if we focus on the nature of the 
political power that corporations wield in the era of globalization (Wilks 2013, Barkan 
2013). Thus, governance scholars have been called upon to pay ‘much more 
attention to the political strategic environment that informs diverse regulatory goals’ 
(Coen & Pegram 2015: 418). The dichotomy between the economic and political 
sphere is more complex than corporate crime scholarship has often portrayed it as 
being, but is also more problematic than regulation and governance scholarship has 
tended to view it; thus, state-corporate crime scholarship offers important insights for 
the development of both fields. 
The Relationship between Public and Private 
The sharpest contrast between white-collar crime and regulatory governance is that 
around the space and attention given to issues of non-state governance. Corporate 
criminology has tended to focus on the formal exercise of state power, whereas 
regulation and governance is a field where traditional (state) criminalization is 
relatively rare, as a component of decentred, compliance-seeking systems. Most 
examples of ‘governance’ approaches explicitly involve finding alternatives to state-
led intervention. This divide has hardened since Sutherland (1949) defined white-
collar crime so as to encompass issues of civil liability and non-criminal harms, and 
since Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) conceptualized regulation as involving both the 
state, business, and civil society. In fact, a defining feature of the emergent research 
of the 1990s and 2000s at the intersection of corporate criminology and regulatory 





compliance, and the ways in which state sanctions and social pressures reinforced 
each other’s effectiveness (Gunningham et al 1999; Gunningham et al. 2004; 2005; 
Kagan et al. 2011; Thornton et al. 2005; 2009; Lacey 2004). Many contemporary 
corporate criminologists have thus been prompted to interrogate the complexity and 
changing nature of this public/private frontier (for example, Lord & King 2018; 
McGrath 2015; Parker et al. 2017; Shi & van Rooij 2016).  
Private or ‘informal’ disciplinary mechanisms, which are often premised on ideas of 
corporate citizenship, can thus be seen as a supplement to State-led efforts at 
corporate control rather than as a direct alternative, although not an unproblematic 
one form a criminological point of view, not least that their legitimacy and 
effectiveness are empirically and conceptually questionable (Gibbs 2012; Lord & 
King 2018; Rorie 2015). Despite this, critical criminological scholarship seems 
wedded to ‘big government’ without recognizing the fundamental transformation of 
the regulatory capitalist state and the explosion of hybrid forms of governance that 
has occurred in recent years (Levi-Faur 2012). Critical corporate criminologists 
perceive private audits, self-regulation, public private collaboration and corporate 
governance to function primarily as reputational window-dressing, offering a purely 
cosmetic form of compliance (‘Potemkin villages’: Gray 2006) which still allows for 
the exploitation of legal loopholes (Nelken 2012), and as an expression of the 
ambiguities and privileges surrounding the crimes of the powerful. At the same time, 
however, critical scholars also critique the relative weakness and limited reach of 
state-based regulation in responding to globalized harms and transnational corporate 
actors (Barkan 2013; Friedrichs & Rothe 2014). 
This critical view of regulatory governance narrows our understanding by equating 
the regulatory state with neoliberal deregulation (Levi-Faur 2013). It arguably 
undervalues the importance of augmenting or aligning the formal criminal law with 
more bottom-up, community- digital- and market-based forms of social control 
(Lacey 2004; Ward & Green 2016). There are non-criminal systems of administrative 
sanctioning which increasingly possess greater power, capacity, and deterrent 
impact than prosecutorial agencies, and fields of ‘beyond-the-state’ regulation which 
exert just as, if not more, effective control than state-led alternatives (Haines 1999; 
Grabosky 2013; Parker et al. 2017). As such, the criminological study of 





account the full diversity of state, community and market actors, and modalities, 
involved in the ‘regulatory space’ of criminalization (Lacey 2004; Rorie 2015). It 
should also pay more attention to the punitive capacity of a fuller range of private 
and informal ‘sanctions’, including professional bans, media ‘naming and shaming’ 
campaigns (van Erp 2011), social media accountability (Grabosky 2013) and 
systems of civil penalties, that contribute to the practice of corporate social control 
(Black 2002). The growing recognition of private security (CCTV, private policing) 
and administrative sanctioning (such as ASBOs in the U.K.) within mainstream 
criminology, along with the increasing use made of corporate policing to enable 
secrecy and control, and to limit reputational damage (Meerts 2014; van Erp 2017), 
suggests that there is a pressing need for corporate criminology scholarship to 
expand its focus to account for these variations (Bures & Carrapico 2017).  
On the other hand, regulatory governance scholars sometimes appear to paint a too 
rosy picture of public-private collaborative governance, private regulation, and the 
power of market sanctions (Coen & Pegram 2015). The capacity of private actors 
and public-private governance networks to process information, avoid ‘groupthink’, 
and support accountability, have been found to be limited by empirical studies across 
a variety of sectors, from banking (Ford 2010), to deepwater drilling (Mills & Koliba 
2015), to cybersecurity (van Erp 2017). Common flaws found in such settings include 
a tendency for self-reinforcing ‘confirmation biases’ to emerge in the decision-making 
of regulatory actors who closely share both operational assumptions and industry 
cultures (Ford 2010: 485; Mills & Koliba 2015: 86). Case-studies have also identified 
the ways in which corporate control limits the application of core constitutional 
principles such as transparency, privacy, and due process (Benish & Levi-Faur 
2012). Examples include the curtailment of media reporting on corporate 
environmental crimes, such as BP banning journalists from the site of the Macondo 
Oil Spill (Bradshaw 2015), or aggressive litigation by Trafigura against attempts by 
The Guardian and the BBC to report on the Probo Koala toxic waste dump in Cote 
d’Ivoire (van Wingerde 2015). The regulatory state itself has been implicated in the 
process of managing and insulating against the consequences of institutional 
corruption scandals, particularly those that occur within public institutions (Greer & 
McLaughlin 2017) or illegal transnational trade of environmental commodities 





case-studies has only a limited capacity to support wide-ranging theorization and 
generalization (Shover & Hochstetler 2006; Rorie et al. 2017), meaning that the 
integration of these findings into regulatory governance scholarship has been limited. 
Conclusion: Towards an Integrated Research Agenda? 
The impetus behind this paper arose from our mutual puzzlement about the 
disciplinary divide that has grown between regulation and governance studies and 
corporate criminology in recent years. Via exploration of the differences in approach 
between these two disciplinary areas, and of potential avenues of fertilization 
between them, we have established that the dominant voice of ‘corporate 
criminology’, at least as perceived within the regulation and governance field, has 
been one which has failed to offer much in the way of innovation, methodological 
scope, and impact upon broader debate, apart from an oppositional form of contrast. 
But our investigation has demonstrated that, contrary to this perception, which is 
perhaps widespread within regulation and governance spheres, corporate 
criminology (broadly understood) does have much of value to offer. Adopting an 
empirically-informed, integrated criminological lens can inform inquiries into the role 
of agency, individual motivations, and organizational culture in shaping offending and 
non-compliance, broadening the scope from the institutionalist and economic 
rationalities predominant in regulatory governance scholarship. More critical forms of 
corporate criminology (and particularly, scholarship on state-corporate crime) do 
problematize issues of structural power and ambiguity in very valuable ways, offering 
a politicized perspective on state-corporate relations in terms of power imbalances 
and perhaps answering calls for more public rather than policy-oriented scholarship. 
And both interpretive and empirical forms of corporate criminology highlight the 
limitations of private governance and self-regulation, and thus assist regulatory 
governance scholarship in developing a more realistic account of the governance 
capacity of private actors. These potential contributions do not undermine the value 
of regulatory governance scholarship, but underline the value of looking at the same 
issue in more than one way. 
We have also noted that critical corporate criminology scholarship has often 
remained relatively unresponsive to some of the key concerns of mainstream 





regulation and governance studies (such as private and administrative sanctioning, 
publicity, and social accountability). As we have argued, a narrow focus on punitive 
state intervention creates a risk that corporate criminology offers only an incomplete 
understanding of the current practice of governing corporate crimes, in which 
prevention, self-regulation and social control may be more important than criminal 
justice. At the same time, questions over the role that prosecution plays in shaping 
corporate behaviour remain unanswered, and debate over whether the regulatory 
pyramid functions and whether (and how) the ‘benign big gun’ of criminal sanctioning 
really works is as alive as when Responsive Regulation was written in 1992. The 
formations of private governance that are so central to regulatory studies give rise, 
when applied via mechanisms such as private security and corporate public 
relations, to vital questions about transparency, public accountability and democratic 
oversight of corporate activity, all of which impact on public support for regulation 
(Benish & Levi-Faur 2012). On each of these fronts, corporate criminology has an 
opportunity to make a major contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of 
regulation and control, but has arguably not been engaged with in such a way as to 
fulfil these needs in practice. 
At the same time, assessments of the effectiveness and socio-political implications 
of non-criminal regulatory arrangements could benefit greatly from a more sustained 
engagement with longstanding criminological concepts such as deterrence, 
punitiveness, and culture. For example, in what ways are administrative sanctions 
punitive, and do they deter in the same way as criminal sanctions? How are 
regulatory inspections and certification audits experienced as different, and does the 
‘threat’ of withdrawal of a private certificate actually shape behaviour in a deterrent 
way? How and why do regulatory systems and compliant behaviours break down, 
and what influence do cultural formations (internal and external to the corporation) 
have on these processes? Important research questions also arise at the 
intersection of criminal justice and governance, in particular over the indirect and 
extended governance impacts of criminal prosecution. The globalisation of corporate 
activity means that corporations are exposed to a shifting and diverse range of 
regimes of control, many of which involve the threat of prosecution. An increased 
emphasis on criminalization within one regime, for example, the USA’s Racketeer 





on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, may have effects on governance 
in others, leading to regulatory disruptions and the imposition of radically different 
norms. It was the threat of prosecution of Swiss banks under the RICO Act that led 
Switzerland to introduce tax secrecy regulations and abandon a longstanding 
division between private finance and public law (Emmenegger 2015). Similarly, the 
OECD Convention led many national jurisdictions around the world to reform their 
rules on corporate criminal liability, resulting in an expansion of the idea of ‘corporate 
homicide’ into previously-resistant regimes (Almond 2013). Criminalization is a tool 
for corporate control, but it is also capable of radically rearranging existing 
governance arrangements, and of more strongly condemning rule transgressions, in 
moral terms, than administrative or civil regulation. These tendencies need to be 
better understood, and accounted for, along with the political contexts within which 
regulation develops. 
Our core ambition in this paper has been to demonstrate the opportunities that would 
arise from a convergence of attention and understanding between the fields of 
corporate criminology and regulation and governance studies, rather than to 
advance one of these at the expense of the other. It is important to be realistic about 
the limits of our understanding, and to recognise that the disciplinary traditions within 
which we position ourselves carry significant implications in terms of the focus of our 
attentions, and our grasp of what is possible and desirable. Regulation and 
governance scholars are thus presented with an opportunity to broaden the focus of 
their attentions, and so question core assumptions about the organisational nature of 
action, the apolitical nature of regulatory arrangements, and the functionality of 
governance-based arrangements. The existing corporate crime scholarship offers a 
number of ways in which these assumptions can be challenged. It also highlights the 
potential for regulation and governance studies to influence a broader field of inquiry 
by demonstrating the variability, significance, and complexity of the realities of the 
regulatory domain, and the ways in which governance-based solutions can resolve 
some of the entrenched difficulties of corporate crime control. This is a process of 
opening conversations and prompting interactions between scholars working in 
parallel, and who currently only ‘touch from a distance’; it is hoped that this review 
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